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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURI HAS PROPER JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEALS 
OF THE LOWER COURT ORDER DISMISSING THE ACTION, THE 
DENIAL MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OF PLAINTIFF, AND THE 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES. 
In order to preserve judicial economy, Appellant hereby incorporates by reference 
his Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Disposition and Mem* i ;m.ti n in 
Opposition in Support Thereof previously filed with this Court. More importantly, 
Appellant reemphasizes the fact that this Court has already denied the Appellees Motion 
for Summary Disposition, which contained the same argument as Argument I. of the Brief 
of Appellees. 
In short, the Appellees inaccurately contend that this Court lacks the proper 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeals before the Court because the time frame to appeal 
has lapsed. However, Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah R. App. P. specifically allow an appeal 
from a final order within 30 days of the date of the order. On November 07, 2007, the 
Trial Court entered an Order contemplated by the Appellees as being the bases for their 
appeal timeframe analysis. Contained within that Order is an award of attorneys' fees and 
costs, which is based upoi i tl le si ibmission of an affidavit ai id a corresponding future 
order. Appellees argue that this was a final order, which begins the timeframe to appeal 
under the Utah R. App. P. However, this is contrary to Utah case law. The Utah 
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Supreme Court in Promax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2004 UT 4, f l5 , 998 P.2d 254, 
specifically ruled that "a trial court must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a 
party before the judgment becomes final for the purposes of an appeal under Utah Rule Appellate 
Procedure 3." Here, the Trial Court contemplated and adhered to Promax in that the Order 
entered November 07, 2007 mandates an affidavit of attorneys' fees to decipher the sum certain 
amount of the judgment. More importantly, after the affidavits were submitted the Trial Court 
entered a, final order on January 08, 2008. Thus, the timeframe to appeal the final order began on 
January 08, 2008; all "post-judgment" motions subsequently filed after this date toll of time for 
appeal, unlike what the Appellees contend. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal before 
based upon the workings of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah case law. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT AFFIRM THE DECISIONS OF THE 
LOWER COURT BECAUSE THE APPELLANT HAS MARSHALED THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The Appellant has satisfied his burden to marshal all the evidence. The Appellant 
has the burden of marshalling all evidence in the record that would support the 
determination reached by the trial court. Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & 
Smith Associates, 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Appellee wrongfully contends that 
Appellee has not satisfied this burden. However, the record, documents filed, and circumstances 
surrounding this appeal clearly illustrate that the Appellant has exhaustively supplied this court 
with the necessary evidence for appeal as required by Interior and Rule 24 of the Utah R. App. P. 
First, in the Brief of the Appellees, the Appellees alleged that Appellant has not included 
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the orders from the lower court or listed the facts underlying the orders from the lower court as 
prescribed by Rule 24(a)(l 1)(C) of the Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(l 1)(C) states that the 
Addendum to the Brief of the Appellant shall contain "those parts of the record on appeal that are 
of central importance to the determination of the appeal." According to the mandates of this 
Rule, Appellee has satisfied his requirement, i.e., everything that is of central importance to the 
appeal is contained in the Addendum of the Brief of the Appellant. Appellee attempts to argue to 
this court that the mandates in Rule 24(a)(l 1)(C) is considered marshalling the evidence as 
required in Rule 24(a)(9). The Legislature of the State of Utah would have incorporated both of 
these Rules into each other or referenced marshalling the evidence in the other if that was the 
legislative intent of the Legislature. See Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52, ^ | 16, 
167 P.3d 1011; Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57,130, 167 P.3d 
1016. This is obviously not the case; otherwise, both Rules would have been incorporated or 
referenced within the other. 
Similarly, Rule 24(a)(9) mandates that a "party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." (emphasis added). The 
Appellant has satisfied this rule by: (1) filing with this Court, all the record evidence from the 
lower District Court as directed by Rule 11 of the Utah R. App. P.; (2) filing the transcript of the 
challenged finding from the Bench Trial on November 05, 2007, pursuant to Rule 11(e)(2) of the 
Utah R. App. P.; and (3) referring to the record evidence as contained in the Argument of the 
Brief of the Appellant in order to "demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the court below, it is insufficient to support the finding under attack." Interior at 
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933. More importantly, this Court specifically held that there is "no need for an appellant to 
marshal the evidence when the findings [of the trial court] are so inadequate that they cannot be 
meaningfully chcillenged as factual determinations." Anderson v. Domes, 1999 UT App 207, 
110, 984 P.2d 392 (quoting Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). 
Assuming that this court has reviewed the Transcript from the Bench Trial on November 05, 
2007 it is very apparent therein that there are no factual determinations from the trial court. 
Rather, the Trial Court dismissed the case with prejudice without any factual determinations as to 
why. Accordingly, the Appellee has met his burden of marshalling the evidence in congruence 
with both the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah case law. 
111. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE 
ACTION, DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, DENYING THE 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE, AND IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES, 
a. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Dismissing The Action 
And Denying The Motion For A New Trial. 
In Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, ^ [28, this Court considered the following 
factors in determining whether the trial court exceeded it's discretion in dismissing an 
action with prejudice when the plaintiff was not ready to proceed with the trial on the first 
day of trial: 
(1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to 
move the case forward; (3) what each of the parties has done to move the 
case forward; (4) what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the 
other side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal. 
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In response the Brief of the Appellee, the Appellant hereby incorporates by 
references his Argument contained in the Brief of the Appellant regarding the Rohan 
factors one through three. However, in specific response to the Appellees' application of 
the fourth factor in Rohan, Appellant vigorously contests that the Appellee suffered either 
minimal prejudice or no prejudice at all. The Appellees list a fashionable array of items 
that seem, at first glance, to equate to prejudice but in reality are nothing more than 
conjecture and speculation. The Appellees lists no concrete prejudicial effect that was 
"caused" by the dismissal as required by the fourth factor in Rohan. Furthermore and 
more importantly, the "trial court's discretion "must be balanced against" the priority of 
" 'affording disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them.' " 
Rohan at [^28 (emphasis added). Therefore, it is obvious that the Appellant's "caused" 
prejudice of not having an opportunity to be heard, far out weighs the speculative 
prejudice of the Appellees of what may occur in the future. Finally, the fifth factor in 
Rohan specifically addresses whether or not injustice would result by the dismissal. Here, 
it is paramount that this Court recognizes that the Appellant's opportunity to be heard was 
stripped by the Trial Court's abuse of discretion by obviously not incorporating the 
"priority" of that opportunity in its balancing as dictated in Rohan. 
8 
Again for the remainder of the arguments contained in the Brief of the Appellee, 
Appellant hereby incorporates by reference Argument III. contained within the Brief of 
the Appellant. In short, the Appellant and the counsel for the Appellant reasonably relied 
on court documents, pleadings, correspondence, and the surrounding circumstances, 
which reflected the dates of the bench trial to begin on November 6, 2007. Furthermore, 
Appellees again attempt to use pure conjecture, speculation, and opinion to convince this 
Court that the Appellant did not act in reasonable reliance on the specific documentation. 
b. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying The Motion To 
Set Aside. 
Again, in order to preserve judicial economy, Appellant hereby incorporates by 
reference Argument II. contained within the Brief of the Appellant. More specifically, 
the Appellant would like to reemphasize the reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ^|63, regarding Rule 60(b) motions, in that it is an abuse 
of discretion to refuse to vacate an judgment when there is reasonable justification or 
excuse. Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that the entering of a default 
judgment was never intended to be used to punish the attorneys when there is a chance to 
do "grave injustice to the client." McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d 
129, 130-131 (Utah 1960). Thus, the appropriate punishment should have been directed 
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at the Appellant's counsel and not the dismissal of the Appellant's action which would 
prejudice him by stripping his opportunity to be heard. 
c. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding Attorney's 
Fees. 
Again, in order to preserve judicial economy, Appellant hereby incorporates by 
reference Argument II. contained within the Brief of the Appellant. In short, Appellees 
incorrectly contend that Appellant provides no case law constituting an error of law in 
awarding attorneys fees. Appellee Br. P. 33. Contrary to the Appellees' assertion, 
Appellant cites Wardley Better Homes and Garden v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, ^ [30, which 
explains that the court can award attorneys' fees under statute when a claim is without 
merit. In light of this, the Brief of the Appellant continues to show that the Trial Court 
specifically ruled that the Appellant's claim has merit and was not brought in bad faith; 
thus, suggesting that the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys fees in 
light of Wardley. Additionally, both counsel for the Appellees requested only the fees for 
their preparation for trial. (T.4). The courts inherent power to sanction attorneys by 
awarding attorneys' fees should not escape the confines of deterrence and enter the unjust 
world of punishment. See Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 2001 UT 86,1f4l, 34 P.3d 194 (Utah 2001) 
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CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's decisions, Order of Dismissal, and Judgments for attorneys' 
fees should be reversed and this matter remanded to the Trial Court for trial. 
DATED this 7^ day of August, 2008. 
a&. Richard S. Nemelka 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
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